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INTRODUCTION
The concept of "value" is fundamental to contract damage rules
and related economic theory. The law attaches inconsistent meanings
to the word value in different contexts, resulting in contract damage
rules that are unnecessarily complex.' The meaning of value in
economics has no apparent connection to the meaning of value in
law, which obscures the intuition underlying economic theory. When
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enthusiasm and interest in the subject matter of this Article.
1. See infra Part Il.
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economic theory is applied to contract law, the confusion over what
value means results in an unnecessarily confusing analysis of the
incentives created by overly complex contract remedies.
The conflicting uses of the word value in law would be of no great
significance if economics were irrelevant to contract law, but contracts
are understood as a means for reallocating resources from less
valuable to more valuable uses, thereby increasing the wealth of
society.2  Contract damage rules are understood as promoting
"efficient breach," which means that the rules create incentives for
parties to breach only when the resource that is the subject matter of
the contract subsequently will be devoted to a more valuable use.'
Economic theory has a well-accepted definition of value that conflicts
with the law's definition. The leading text in law and economics
defines the economic value of something as "how much someone is
willing to pay for it or, if he has it already, how much money he
demands for parting with it."4 When evaluating whether a contract
breach is efficient, it becomes clear that economists interpret "the
most valuable use" as "the most profitable use," or the one that
generates the greatest profit or surplus.' Despite the conflict and the
fact that the theory of efficient breach is addressed in every major
contracts casebook, the relationship between the value of a contract
2. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 31 (4th ed. 1992) ("Common law
... can be conceived in economic terms as having three parts [including] ... the law of
contracts, [which is] concerned with facilitating the voluntary movement of property rights into
the hands of those who value them the most ... ."); see also DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 189 (1992) (citing voluntary exchange as playing
important role in allocating goods and services efficiently).
3. See BARNES & STOUT, supra note 2, at 232 (finding breach efficient when it creates
sufficient benefit such that promisor can compensate promisee fully and still be better off by
breaching than by performing and leaving one party better off and no one worse off); ROBERT
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 291 (1988) (finding breach efficient when
resources needed for performance are more valuable in alternative use).
4. POSNER, supra note 2, at 12.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 51-53.
6. See RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRNE 171-73 (1995); STEVEN J.
BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 289-91 (1995); JOHN D. CALAMARI ET AL., CASES AND
PROBLEMS ON CONTRACTS 639-45 (2d ed. 1989); THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLASJ. WHALEY,
CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 381-88, 405-06, 453-56 (2d ed. 1993);JOHN P.
DAWSON Er AL, CASES AND COMMENT ON CONTRACTS 31-32, 151 (6th ed. 1993); E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 20-22 (5th ed. 1995);
LON L. FULLER & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 205-08 (5th ed. 1990); CHARLES
L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 1009-16
(3d ed. 1993); EDWARDJ. MURPHY & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 1037 (4th
ed. 1991); JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., CONTRACTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 657-58 (4th ed. 1991);
ROBERT E. SCOTT & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 82-83, 792-94 (2d ed.
1993); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLGATION:
THEORY, DOCrRINE, AND PRACTICE 225-26, 330-36 (2d ed. 1992).
CONTR CT DAMAGES AND CONTACT THEORY
and the most valuable use of a resource is not explored and the
implications of conflicting definitions are not discussed.
The confusion over the meaning of value makes it difficult to
understand and to apply both damage rules and efficient breach
theory. This Article clarifies the meaning of value in its various uses
and shows how that meaning relates to one motive for encouraging
contracting-promoting the allocation of resources to their most
valuable uses. In addition, this Article argues for an alternative
description of the damage measure based on lost surplus.' The
surplus-based damage rule is free from ambiguity and applicable to a
wide variety of cases, which simplifies the understanding of damage
theory.
Part I of this Article discusses the meaning of value as set forth in
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and how it relates to an alternative
measure of damages based on the net benefit that the injured party
expected to realize. Although all of the Restatement interpretations of
value give consistent results in simple, straightforward cases, none can
be applied to all cases. This conflict encourages a search for a
consistent, intuitively appealing method for measuring damages for
breach of contract that is easy to apply. The surplus-based damage
rule is such a method.
People enter into contracts to improve their lot in life, whether
measured in terms of wealth or otherwise. It is appropriate to think
about damages in terms of the extent to which the breaching party
denies the injured party the improvement or enhancement of
condition the injured party would have realized had the breach not
occurred. Part II of this Article describes how the economist's focus
on surplus value compares to the law's focus on total value, and Part
III reconceptualizes the theory of efficient breach as a means of
7. To capture both lost profits (the excess above the costs that a business anticipates from
another's performance of his promise) and lost consumer surplus (the amount above cost that
a consumer anticipates from another's performance), this Article refers to both as lost surplus.
The sophisticated reader should be alerted to the fact that at least one commentator uses the
word "surplus" in a specialized, and not entirely consistent, manner to describe the amount in
excess of anticipated profit a seller realizes from a particularly favorable resale that follows a
buyer's breach. See 3 WILLIAM D. HAWIxLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-706:01
(1995) (discussing obligation of seller to account to buyer for surplus realized over contract
price because of resale). The economic concepts of producer and consumer surplus are
discussed in all major law and economics texts. See, e.g., BARNES & STOuT, supra note 2, at 362-
68 (using banning of lawn darts by Consumer Product Safety Commission and regulation of gold
mining by Occupational Safety and Health Administration as illustrations of cost of regulation
as measured by loss in consumer and product surplus); COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 301
(explaining lost-surplus formula that awards victim of breach surplus that injured party would
have received had breaching party performed); POSNER, supra note 2, at 278 (discussing transfer
of wealth accompanying conversion of consumer surplus into producer surplus).
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allocating resources to uses that generate the greatest surplus.
Theoretical support for the current regime of damage rules is derived
from efficient breach theory, which focuses on whether damage
remedies encourage people to allocate resources to their most valuable
uses.8 Appreciation of the significance of the incentives created by
damage rules is enhanced by focusing on the profit or "surplus"
created by the deal rather than on the value of the contract.
Focusing on surplus highlights the resources saved and the wealth
generated by creating appropriate damage remedies.
Part IV of this Article describes how contract damage rules based
on conflicting definitions of value can be reconciled by focusing on
the surplus generated by a contractual exchange. The key to devising
clearer damage rules is to separate "profit" from "value" and to
recognize that, in addition to lost profit, the victim of a contract
breach is entitled to recover all costs incurred to earn such profit and
costs wasted as a result of the breach. These costs include all
expenses, whether in anticipation of the other's performance or
caused by the breach, to the extent that recovery is not denied
because of problems of proof or foreseeability. This approach
facilitates an intuitive understanding of damage rules for cases
involving total or partial breach as well as for cases involving substitute
transactions (including cover and resale), breaches of warranties, and
partial performance.
I. DAMAGE RULES BASED ON VALUE
The quantum of damages to which a complainant is entitled in a
breach of contract action is based on the value she attached to the
other party's performance.9 Three alternative rules are based on this
value. The first rule reflects the general approach of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts- a party injured by another's breach of contract
"has a right to damages based on his expectation interest as measured
by ... the loss in the value to him of the other party's perfor-
mance."'0 The second rule applies to cases in which the breaching
party's performance is defective or incomplete," or in which there
8. See FARNSWORTH &YOUNG, supra note 6, at 20-22 (advocating that contracts be broken
and resources reallocated if party in breach will be better off after paying damages).
9. See id. at 483.
10. RSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347(a) (1979) (emphasis added).
11. See id. § 347 cmt. b (finding that defective or partial performance will result in loss in
value equal to difference between value that performance would have had absent breach and
value of such performance as actually rendered).
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is a breach of warranty." Under the second rule, the injured party
is entitled to recover the difference in value between the performance
received and the performance promised.'" The third rule awards
the victim of a contract breach the contract price, which, according
to commentators, measures the full value of the performance prom-
ised.
1 4
Subject to rules limiting recovery to unavoidable,
15 foreseeable, 16
and provable damages17 and to various adjustments reflecting the
facts of particular cases, each of these measures can be employed to
arrive at a correct calculation of the appropriate damage amount if
the meaning of value in the context of the particular case is under-
stood. The first rule provides the basis for calculating damages in all
straightforward cases of contract breach, without regard to the nature
of the injured party's expectations or to the types of costs the injured
party incurred in anticipation of the breaching party's perfor-
mance.'" The second rule describes the measure of damages in
more complicated cases involving breaches of warranty and defective,
partial, and substantial performance, as well as in cases involving cover
by a buyer or resale by a seller.9 The meaning of value, however,
is not the same in these two rules and may be the same as the third
measure of damages based on the contract price only coincidentally.
This Article demonstrates that value in the Restatement sense usually
means the total benefit that the recipient of another's performance
would have derived from the performance. In the more complicated
cases, value is interpreted most accurately as including only the profit
(or surplus return above that necessary to cover costs) associated with
each party's performance. The contract price is only sometimes an
accurate measure of the total benefits to the recipient and seldom
equivalent to the anticipated profit. The lack of clarity in the
meaning of value makes contract damage rules difficult to understand
and apply.
12. See U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (1978) ("The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the
difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the
value they would have had if they had been as warranted. .. ").
13. See RESTATENENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. b.
14. See 5A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRACTs §§ 1188-1191 (1964 & Supp. 1996).
15. SeeRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 (reducing damages awarded to parties
injured by breach who fail to take reasonable steps to avoid losses).
16. See id. § 351 (denying recovery of damages that breaching party did not have reason to
foresee).
17. See id § 352 (denying recovery of damages that cannot be established with reasonable
certainty).
18. See infra Part lV.A (analyzing expectation-based damage calculation under Restatement).
19. See inffa Part 1V.B (analyzing damage calculation based on difference between per-
formance promised and performance received).
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It is complicated to examine the various sorts of losses resulting
from a contract breach and the social consequences of a breach
without a common framework for understanding the expectation
theory of damages. This theory is widely accepted and applied in
breach of contract cases by all courts in the United States. 20 In
principle, the expectation damage measure is designed to put the
victim of a contract breach in the same position, with respect to
wealth, as if the breaching party had performed. 1 Because we are
concerned with wealth, it would be useful to be able to relate both
this damage measure and the "position with respect to wealth" to well-
defined rules of contract damages and to the concept of value, which
is central to the analysis of efficient breach.
The Restatement provides a convenient starting point for the
description of a value-based theory of damages.22 Section 347(a)
states the rule that "the injured party has a right to damages ... as
measured by the loss in the value to him of the other party's perfor-
mance." 23  Value, as used in the Restatement, refers to all of the
benefits that the injured party would have received as a result of the
breaching party's performance. 24 Value is not simply the profit she
expected, nor is it necessarily just the benefit the breaching party
would have conveyed to her. The value includes the profit from the
deal itself and any larger project of which this contract was an integral
part.25 The value also includes enough money to pay for all of the
costs associated with the deal (and, again, any larger project of which
20. SeeRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 cmt. b (defining expectation interest);
FARNgSvORTH & YOUNG, supra note 6, at 13 (discussing expectation interest and comparing to
reliance and restitution).
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. a (noting that contract damages
based on injured party's expectation interests are intended to position injured party as if
performance had taken place).
22. See id. § 347 (measuring damages in terms of injured party's expectation interest and
loss of value).
23. Id. § 347(a) (emphasis added).
24. See id. § 347 cmt. b (measuring value by benefit received from performance).
25. See id. § 347(b) (stating that injured party has right to recover losses consequential to
contract breach). Illustration 2 describes a case in which the profit is earned from resale to a
third party rather than from the sale to the breaching party. The resale is the larger project of
which this contract is a part. An application of this rule from case law appears in Laredo Hides
Co. v. H & HMeat Products Co., 513 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974), in which H & H breached
a contractual promise to sell hides to Laredo. Id. at 213-14. The contract to purchase hides was
part of a larger project, as Laredo had promised to sell the hides to tanneries in Mexico. Id.
at 216. After the breach, Laredo was able to acquire sufficient hides, albeit at a higher price,
to complete the project with the tanneries. Id. H & H was held liable for enough damages to
ensure that Laredo realized the expected profit from this deal with subsequent buyers. Id. at
223. For further discussion of Laredo Hides Co., see infra text accompanying notes 70-76.
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the contract was a part), whether paid to the breaching party or to
someone else.
26
Separating "value" from "profit" is not intuitive. It is tempting to
think of the value of the contract as the profit to be earned as a result
of the other's performance. In the Restatement sense, however, the
value of a property that one buys from another is the revenue stream
that property generates for the purchaser, much like the value of a
piece of rental real estate is the rental income the property generates.
The costs of acquiring, managing, and maintaining the property
(generating the revenue) are deducted from that revenue stream,
leaving profit. Thus, the value of the property (all of the future
revenue) includes enough to cover the costs and to leave some
amount of profit or surplus remaining.
Contracts casebooks often begin the discussion of damages with
cases involving the definition of "value" in a consumer context
27
Hawkins v. McGee8 and Sullivan v. O'Connor29 both involved plastic
surgery. After the respective operations, the patients expected a
perfect hand" or a beautiful nose." That is the value of the
operation. Because these are cases involving consumers,32 the profit
or consumer surplus 33 is the difference between the value of the
perfect hand or beautiful nose and the psychogenic and financial cost
of the procedure. Value clearly is more than just financial profit. It
also includes the costs, whether paid to the doctor (a direct cost such
as a doctor's fee), a third party (the hospital, for instance), or
expended and benefitting no other person (the pain suffered by the
26. See Laredo Hides Co., 513 S.W.2d at 223 (awarding damages with interest).
27. See, e.g., CRANDALL & WHALEY, supra note 6, at 3 (discussing case granting specific
performance of agreement to sell real estate); FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note 6, at 483
(discussing plaintiff's loss in value as primary measure for damages resulting from contract
breach); FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 6, at 192 (discussing case that provided damages to
patient following faulty skin graft).
28. 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929).
29. 296 N.E.2d 183 (Mass. 1973).
30. See Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641, 643 (N.H. 1929).
31. See Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 184 (Mass. 1973).
32. Because Sullivan v. O'Connor involved an entertainer, see id. at 184, the surplus the
plaintiff might have derived from the plastic surgery would have enhanced her business profits
(producer surpluses) as well as her private pleasure (consumer surplus). In Hawkins v. McGee,
the plaintiff's injury was work related, see id. at 642, so perhaps there was a profit component in
that value as well, though it is less clear. If the plaintiff's surgery in any way was intended to
increase the vocational utility of his hand, then there was a profit component; if it was purely
cosmetic, then probably not. At any rate, because both are surplus, they are analytically
indistinguishable. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 300-01 (relating substitute price and lost-
surplus formulas as measures for damages to concept of consumer surplus).
33. Surplus, whether profit or consumer surplus, is the difference between the value that
a party attaches to what she receives as a result of the other's performance and what she gives
up in order to obtain that benefit. For a discussion of the economic meaning of these terms,
see supra note 7 (defining lost profit and lost consumer surplus collectively as lost surplus).
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patient). In the consumer context, there may be no stream of
revenue flowing from the contract, but rather a stream of pleasure or
utility. The value reflects all of the pleasure or utility derived from
the contract. The surplus or profit is that amount of pleasure or
utility left after all of the costs associated with contracting have been
paid.
Section 347 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts intends that
"value" include more than simply the net gain (whether consumer
surplus or profit); value must include all of the anticipated benefits
that a party expects to receive, some of which will be offset by costs
she has incurred and the balance going to profit.' After determin-
ing the value of the contract as instructed by section 347(a), section
347(b) requires addition of "any other loss, including incidental and
consequential loss, caused by the breach.""5 After this addition,
section 347(c) requires subtraction of "any cost or other loss that he
has avoided by not having to perform." 6 Subtracting costs avoided,
as instructed in section 347(c), presents no particular conceptual
difficulty. The victim of a breach is likely to have saved some
anticipated expenses when one party breaches before the victim has
performed. When a buyer repudiates a contract to purchase real
estate, for instance, the seller may save brokerage fees and taxes that
are due only if the sale is completed." The injured party, having
avoided those expenses, would be overcompensated if her damages
included an allowance for them.
Confusion does arise when "other losses" are added to the value
described in section 347 (b). If value includes surplus plus enough to
cover anticipated costs, why does the rule instruct us to add costs
incurred to value? These are unanticipated, breach-related costs,"3
34. The Restatenwt provides:
Subject to the limitations stated in §§ 350-53, the injured party has a right to damages
based on his expectation interest as measured by
(a) the loss in the valueto him of the other party's performance caused by its failure
or deficiency, plus
(b) any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by the breach,
less
(c) any cost or other loss that he has avoided by not having to perform.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1979) (emphasis added).
35. Id. § 347(b).
36. Id. § 347(c).
37. See Sabin-Goldberg v. Horn, 578 N.Y.S. 2d 187, 189 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (awarding
seller of property lost profit less brokerage fee and tax upon breach by buyer).
38. This Article uses the term "breach-related costs" to refer to these incidental and
consequential costs collectively, because the analysis of breach requires no distinction and
because linguistic confusion arises over the terms "incidental" and "consequential."
The Restatement uses "incidental" to include "costs incurred in a reasonable effort, whether
successful or not, to avoid loss" from the breach-clearly expenses that would not have been
[Vol. 46:1
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which must be distinguished from costs the injured party had
expected to incur. The Restatement intends these "other losses,
including incidental and consequential loss" to include only those
costs that resulted from the breach but that would not have been
among the anticipated direct and collateral costs 9 of earning the
incurred had the breachingparty performed. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt.
c. The Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") employs a similar usage. See U.C.C. § 2-710
(1977) (providing that incidental damages to seller include commercially reasonable charges
incurred in stopping delivery after buyer's breach); see id. § 2-715(1) (providing that incidental
damages resulting from seller's breach include expenses reasonably incurred in inspection and
custody of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges in connection with
effecting cover, and other reasonable expense incident to breach).
One of the most influential articles in contract damage law, however, uses the term
"incidental" to refer to the collateral expenses a contracting party incurs in order to enhance
the profit he will make from the contract in question. Lon Fuller and William Perdue refer to
these collateral expenses as "incidental reliance." See Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue,Jr., The
Reliance Interest in ContractDamages: 1, 46 YALE LJ. 52, 78 (1936) (contrasting natural expenses,
or incidental reliance, with necessary expenses, or essential reliance). To avoid such confusion,
this Article refers to these collateral expenses or incidental reliance expenses as "collateral costs."
Although the Restatement's use of "consequential" clearly contemplates losses arising due only
to breach, the U.C.C. uses "consequential" to include lost profits. Compare RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. c, illus. 2 (defining consequential losses as injury to person
or property resulting from defective performance), withJAMESJ. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 268 (3d ed. 1988) (explaining that most common claim for conse-
quential damages involves lost profits). In its section entitled Buyer's Incidental and Consequential
Damage, the U.C.C. provides:
Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which
the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not
reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty.
U.C.C. § 2-715.
Subsection (2) (a) of U.C.C. section 2-715 contemplates "any" loss, including lost profits, but
consequential damages are not limited to lost profits. See HAWivLAND, supra note 7, § 2-710:01
(stating that as general rule, consequential damages are losses involving relationships between
seller and third parties). This logically includes, but is not limited to, losses associated with the
frustration of larger projects of which the contract in question was an integral part. See infra text
accompanyingnote 50 (providing and explainingformula for calculating damages). Given these
linguistic confusions surrounding the terms "incidental" and "consequential," the term "breach-
related" seems more descriptive and avoids ambiguity.
39. Corbin differentiates between expenditures that are part ofperformance and those that
are collateral:
There are many expenditures made in reliance upon an existing contract that can not
properly be regarded as having been made in part performance of it, or even as in
necessary preparation for such performance. Such expenditures as these are not
expected to be compensated directly by the payments or other performance promised
by the defendant, for they do not constitute a party of the agreed exchange.
Nevertheless, the net loss involved in such expenditures may be included in the
damages awarded, if at the time the contract was made the defendant had reason to
foresee that such expenditures would be made and that his own breach would prevent
their reimbursement. These expenditures now referred to are collateral to perfor-
mance of the contract for breach of which the action for damages is brought; and the
net losses resulting may readily be regarded as too remote from contemplation and too
likely to be the result of other factors to justify their inclusion in the damages for
breach. Whenever their inclusion is just, their amount is an addition to the full
contract price unpaid that is, to the full value of the performance promised and not
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profit had the breach not occurred.
The common-law meaning of value is understood more easily when
the Restatement is viewed as recognizing three kinds of costs: the two
types that would have been incurred even if there had been no
breach (direct and collateral costs described above) and those breach-
related costs that would not otherwise have been incurred but for the
breach. In addition to these three types of costs, only the concept of
surplus (whether profit or consumer surplus) must be added to apply
the Restatement rule. If the value of the contract to the injured party
includes the costs that she anticipated incurring plus the surplus, then
the value can be depicted as in the pie chart in Figure 1. The value
is the entire pie-anticipated direct and collateral costs plus surplus.
The breach-related costs, represented by the size of the adjacent
rectangle, are not part of the value; the injured party did not










rendered by the defendant. They are included in damages, not because they would
have been directly reimbursed by the performance promised by the defendant (or by
its "value" as ordinarily measured), but because the defendant's breach has prevented
probable future gains and has rendered determination of their amount impossible.
CORBIN, supra note 14, § 1031 (foomotes omitted).
[Vol. 46:1
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The Restatement rule does not recognize these divisions as surplus
and direct, collateral, and breach-related costs. Rather, it recognizes
them as value,' other losses (breach-related),4' and costs avoid-
ed.42 Some of the anticipated direct and collateral costs associated
with obtaining the profit from the contract may not have been
incurred at the time of breach; they are costs avoided by the breach.
Thus, the direct and collateral category is subdivided into costs actually
incurred and costs avoided. All breach-related costs that a victim
would seek to recover necessarily are incurred.
Damages are calculated, under the Restatement formula, by following
three steps: (1) determining the value of the contract (section
347(a)); (2) adding other losses (section 347(b)); and (3) subtracting
costs avoided (section 347(c)).' Arithmetically, combining steps (1)
and (3) yields an amount equal to the anticipated surplus plus direct
and collateral costs actually incurred. Step (2) adds breach-related
costs actually incurred. Thus, a formula equivalent to the Restatement
approach, but much more straightforward, is as follows: damages
equal lost surplus plus direct and collateral costs actually incurred plus
breach-related costs. Alternatively, and more simply, damages equal
lost surplus plus all costs incurred. The pie chart in Figure 2 shows
the equivalence of the Restatement and surplus-based approaches. The
entire pie represents the value of performance (section 347(a)). The
Restatement formula for damages directs us (in section 347(c)) to
subtract (remove from the pie) costs of all types avoided by the
breach from the value of performance, which leaves only the striped
areas made up of surplus and costs of all types that were incurred. To
this amount, add breach-related costs (as instructed by section
347(b)), represented by the shaded rectangle. Under the alternative
formula, simply add the lost surplus to the actual direct, collateral,
and breach-related costs incurred.
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. b.
41. See id. § 347(a) cm. c.
42. See id. § 347(b) ant. d.
43. See id. § 347(a), (b), (c).
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Equivalent Damages = Value + Breach-related Costs
Damage - Costs Avoided
Formulas = Surplus + Actual Costs (Direct
Collateral and Breach-related)
Direct and Collateral Costs (Direct,
(not included in Damages)
+ Actual Breach-
related CostsSurplus
Actual Direct and Collateral Costs
FIGURE 2
In every case, both the value-based and surplus-based approaches
yield the same result if the data is available. Native Alaskan Reclamation
& Pest Control, Inc. v. United Bank of Alaska is a typical case involving
lost surplus, direct and collateral costs, and breach-related costs.
Figure 3 illustrates the losses suffered by a party who had been
promised a loan from a bank that later withdrew the promise. The
borrower, a corporation planning to buy and restore airplanes for
forest fire fighting, incurred costs amounting to $97,394.22 while
preparing to buy the planes before the bank's default.' After denial
of the promised loan, the borrower incurred an additional $86,705.97
in costs trying reasonably to rescue the deal.46 As a result of the
bank's breach, the corporation also lost its anticipated profit of
$2,385,605.00.
47
44. 685 P.2d 1211 (Alaska 1984).
45. See Native Alaska Reclamation & Pest Control, Inc. v. United Bank of Alaska, 685 P.2d
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Damage Calculation
Native Alaskan v. United Bank
Direct and Collateral Costs
. Avoided (not included in
damages-amount unlmown)
+ Breach-







($97,394.22) Total = $2,589,705.19
FIGURE 3
The Restatement fonrmula is more difficult to apply because the value
of the contract is unknown. Although the amount of direct cost
avoided (the interest payments on the loan) can be calculated
($536,000.00) ,48 there was no indication of the amount of collateral
cost avoided. These collateral costs would have included other
expenses associated with buying and restoring the airplanes. The
alternative formula gives a ready answer to the damages question:
add the anticipated surplus (profit) ($2,385,605.00) to the costs
actually incurred (direct ($0), collateral ($97,394.22), and breach-
related ($86,705.97)) for a total of $2,569,705.19.
41
The damage formula appearing in section 347 of the Restatement
and the surplus-based damage formula are equivalent. Each approach
awards the victim of contract breach her lost profits and compensates
her for losses incurred. The remainder of this Article demonstrates
48. See id.
49. There are cases that do not allow recovery of both profits and costs incurred (whether
direct or collateral), but they do not reflect the intent of the Restatement rule and do not reflect
either the underlying logic of expectation damages or the principle of full compensation. In
Smith v. Onyx Oil & Chemical Co., 218 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1955), for instance, Smith contracted to
sell a chemical product that Onyx promised to develop. See id. at 107. When Onyx repudiated
the contract, Smith sued for lost profits and for more than $3000 in expenses incurred in
getting ready to perform. See id at 110-12. With respect to those expenses, the court held,
"This, we think, is not recoverable. If he has the profit he was to make, had the contract been
performed, he cannot-also have the expenses to which he was put to make that profit." Id. at
112. Without award of those expenses, however, the injured party will not fully realize his
profits. Without recovery of the $3000 in costs incurred, the injured party will have $3000 less
than his expectation, and thus he will be undercompensated. Awarding costs in addition to
profits does not result in double counting; without costs there is undercounting. The Restatement
approach includes recovery of costs incurred as well as profit. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF
CoNTRACrs § 347 cmt. a-d (1979) (allowing for recovery of expectation damages).
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that the relative ease of application of the two approaches depends on
the availability of data and the simplicity of the facts of the case. It
also demonstrates, however, that only the surplus-based approach
generally is applicable. Without tortured interpretation of the provi-
sions of section 347, that approach gives an incorrect result in many
cases.
II. ECONOMIC THEORY BASED ON SURPLUS VALUE
Like the Restatement approach to damages, the economic theory of
efficient breach supposedly is based on the value of the contract. 0
Economists, although identifying their concern as the allocation of
resources to their most valuable uses,51 really are concerned with the
surplus a use generates. Instead of focusing on the total benefit that
one party anticipates from the other's performance (a return
sufficient to cover both costs and a surplus), economists are most
interested in the excess society earns above the costs invested. 2 This
surplus measures the extent to which a party and the society of which
that party is a member are better off as a result of the exchange. The
surplus is profit-producer surplus if the party is engaged in a
business activity and consumer surplus if the party is not.53
Both parties to a contract generally anticipate a surplus at the time
of contract. Why else would one engage in the contracting process?
The extent to which society's welfare improves as a result of contract-
ing is measured by the sum of the surpluses earned by the parties. 4
When economists speak of the value of using a resource in a
particular way, they are referring to the total surplus earned as a
result of that allocative choice.55 Thus, allocating a resource to its
most valuable use means devoting it to the use that produces the
greatest surplus. The economic meaning of "value," which refers only
to the surplus earned as a result of contracting,56 therefore, is at
odds with the Restatement meaning of value, which includes all of the
50. See FARNSWORTH &YOUNG, supra note 6, at 20-21 (reasoning that measure for damages
in efficient breach should be diminution in value to injured party).
51. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 16.
52. See generally COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 49-51 (demonstrating tendency of
economists to look for excess societal earnings above individual satisfaction, even in example of
two-person society).
53. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 278 (describing increases in producer surplus as price
consumers pay increases).
54. See id. at 13-14 (describing efficiency in terms of sum of benefit to contracting parties).
55. See, e.g., COOTER AND ULEN, supra note 3, at 291 (finding efficient breach when
resources needed for performance are more "valuable" in alternative use); PAUL SAMUELSON,
ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYsIs 424-25 (7th ed. 1967) (relating concept of "market
value" to that of "surplus").
56. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 12-16 (explaining economic meaning of value).
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return from a contract, part of which is devoted to repaying costs.
5 7
A party's surplus depends on the costs she must incur in order to
earn the surplus, including both direct58 and collateral59 costs,
57. See supra text accompanying notes 22-26.
58. The direct costs of contracting have been described more precisely in the legal
literature as essential reliance costs. Essential reliance costs are a party's costs of performing her
obligations under the contract, the promises expressly or implicitly included in the contract.
See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 38, at 78 (defining essential reliance as costs necessary to
complete contract). These costs are "essential" in the sense that it is essential that a party bear
the costs of performing her obligations in order to be entitled to either the other's performance
or compensatory damages. See id. A party's essential reliance costs are those associated with
"those acts necessary to the perfection of the plaintiff s rights on the contract." Id. They may
be described more simply as "performance costs," a party's costs associated with performing and
preparing to perform. See id. Fuller and Perdue include under the definition of essential
reliance "the losses involved in entering the contract itself, as, for instance, in foregoing the
opportunity to enter other profitable contracts." Id. By defining essential reliance this way,
Fuller and Perdue promote the recovery of opportunity costs as a conceptual substitute for lost
profits, a position that never has been accepted by the courts. See United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers
of Inwood Forest Assoc., 484 U.S. 365,375-76 (1988) (denying compensation to creditor for lost
opportunity costs).
Thus, the definition of essential reliance is overinclusive for the purposes of this Article. In
the simplest case, a buyer's obligation is to pay the contract price, but a buyer may be obliged
to incur such additional costs as the cost of supplying specifications. In the simplest case, a
seller's only obligation may be to relinquish possession of a resource to the buyer, but it hardly
would be surprising for the seller to be obligated to incur other costs, such as transportation.
A party's performance costs include all costs that party must incur in order for the party to avoid
being in breach of contract. The value of a contract in the Restatement sense includes all
anticipated performance costs, although performance costs avoided because of the other's
breach are subtracted from the value when damages are calculated. SeeRFSTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 347(c) (1979).
59. A party incurs collateral costs, not because he is obliged to do so, but because doing
so will enhance or increase the benefits he derives from the other party's performance. The law
and economics literature describes these costs more precisely as "surplus enhancing reliance
costs," recognizing that a party is not obligated to incur them but will earn a greater surplus by
doing so. See Robert Cooter & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contrac 73 CAL. L.
REV. 1432,1465 (1985). The term "surplus enhancing reliance" appears to have been used first
by Professors Cooter and Eisenberg. See id In their illustration, a boat buyer might buy special
navigational equipment in advance of delivery of the boat so that he can depart on a lengthy
voyage as soon as the boat is delivered rather than delaying his pleasure. See id They use the
term "to refer to discretionary reliance by a contracting party that is undertaken to increase the
surplus over and above what he would enjoy had he simply done what was explicitly or implicitly
required under the contract." iM. In some cases, there is good reason for incurring surplus
enhancing reliance costs in anticipation of the other party's performance, or more simply
enhancing costs, before the time that performance is due. In Anglia Television, Ltd. v. Reed, 3 All
E.R. 690 (CA 1971), a film producer hired a director, designer, stage manager, assistant
manager, and others in anticipation of a film performance by an actor, Robert Reed. All of
these costs were incurred to exploit the talents of Reed and to increase the surplus earned from
the contract with Reed. Even though Anglia Television had promised to pay a salary to Reed
and to pay for his travel and lodging, none of these performance expenses were incurred.
When Reed refused to perform, the court awarded Anglia Television the total of their
enhancing costs incurred. See 3 All E.R. at 695. Anglia Television illustrates that referring to
enhancing costs as a type of reliance cost is somewhat a misnomer. Some of these (recoverable)
costs were incurred prior to formation of the contract with Reed such that the film company
could not have ried on a contract that did not exist at the time the expenditures were made.
Rather, they were enhancing costs in the sense that the film company was not obliged by the
contract with Reed to incur them but did so to increase its profits from the contract it hoped
to sign with Reed. The value of a contract includes all anticipated enhancing costs, though the
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSrIY LAW REvIEW
either in economic terms or under the Restatement approach to
damages.
This part of the Article examines the correspondence between the
economic focus on surplus value and the Restatement focus on total
value. Part III considers efficient breach theory from the perspective
of damages measures based on the loss of surplus. Hereafter, the
word value is used in the Restatement sense to refer to the total value
of the contract, and the words "surplus" or "profit" are used to refer
only to that part of the value that remains after costs are removed.
Economic theory focuses on the surplus realized as a result of
contracting." How the surplus is divided depends on the bargain
struck between the parties. The size of the column in Figure 4
reflects the value to one party of the other's performance in a simple
case in which there are no collateral costs. Figure 4 illustrates a case
in which the recipient of the other's performance-who, for conve-
nience, is called the buyer-would be willing to pay up to $1500 for
that performance, which is the buyer's reservation price. The
reservation price might be determined by the commercial potential
created by the other's performance or by a subjective valuation by the
buyer of the pleasure she anticipates deriving from it. The surplus
earned by the buyer, whether profit or consumer surplus, is the
difference between that maximum amount and the price actually
paid. The price actually paid measures the direct costs. The price
actually paid, hence the surplus derived, is the result of the bargain-
ing between the parties. Figure 4 illustrates a reservation price of
$1500 and direct costs of $1000, yielding a surplus of $500.
Restatement damage formula includes in recovery only the amount actually incurred by
subtracting enhancing costs avoided from the value of the contract. The law governing recovery
of pre-contractual expenses in the United States is unsettled. See Gregory S. Crespi, Recovering
Pre-contractualExpenditures as anElement of RelianceDamages, 49 SMU L. REy. 43 (1995) (discussing
contradictory case law in this area).
60. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 12-16 (defining value, utility, and efficiency through
illustrative models focusing on surplus).
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If a party to a contract must incur collateral costs to realize the
value of the contract, the maximum price she will be willing to pay
will be lower, other things being equal. The column in Figure 5
depicts the surplus in a case in which the promisee anticipates
incurring collateral costs to increase her surplus. The maximum price
the buyer will consider is now constrained by the fact that she must
incur $700 in collateral costs to realize the full contract value of
$1500. Unwilling to pay up to $1500, her reservation price is only
$800. To pay more would result in a loss. Having agreed on a price
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A seller's surplus is determined in an analogous fashion. The
seller's direct costs dictate a reservation price below which he will be
unwilling to make a deal with the buyer. Clever bargaining by a seller
will yield a higher price and higher surplus for him; clever bargaining
by the buyer will yield a lower price and higher surplus for her.
Viewed in this way, bargaining simply involves a negotiation over
division of the total surplus available from the deal; if the promisee
earns more, the promisor earns less. The economic theory underly-
ing efficient breach is not directly concerned with which party gets
how much of the total surplus.6 Society's well-being is maximized
when the total surplus is maximized, without regard to who gets it.62
But the value each party places on performance by the other limits
the total amount of surplus to be shared.
The correspondence between the economic focus on surplus value
and the Restatement focus on total value is straightforward. Figure 6
shows that each of the variables relevant to determining the bargain-
ing range in economic theory translates into an element of damages
under the Restatement approach. A contract has a given value to a
party, represented by either the pie or the column in Figure 6. The
amount of collateral costs necessary to earn the surplus or profit from
the contract (shown in vertical stripes in both the pie and the
column) decreases the maximum amount that a party will be willing
to pay for the other's performance. Once the parties have agreed on
a price for performance, the remainder of the pie or column is
divided into two parts, one reflecting the cost of performance (the
direct cost depicted in horizontal stripes) and the other reflecting
surplus (the shaded slice of pie or portion of column).
Increases in the wealth of society accompany increases in surplus
generated by the parties. Reducing costs increases surplus and wealth.
This correspondence between the economic goal of increasing wealth
and the expectation measure of damages reflected in the Restatement
enables one to evaluate how damage rules affect a party's willingness
to breach and the effect of a breach on society's wealth, as measured
by the surplus gained as a result of a transaction.
61. See generally supra note 6 and texts cited therein (discussing efficient breach in terms of
greater societal good but not specifying distribution of surplus).
62. See FARNSwORTH & YOUNG, supra note 6, at 21 (noting that in efficient breach, "it is in
society's interest that the contract be broken and the resources allocated").
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III. VALUE AND SURPLUS IN EFFICIENT BREACH THEORY
The distinction between value and surplus has obscured the analysis
of incentives created by contract damage rules. Although scholarly
literature has addressed other implications of contract damage
rules,6" efficient breach is the topic of greatest scholarly interest.
Economic analysis suggests that there are times when a party to a
contract should not be compelled to perfonn, 4 and the Restatement
recognizes that this conclusion is consistent with the traditional
63. Prominent among the other incentives created by contract damage rules are incentives
for parties to take precautions to avoid or minimize losses associated with breach. See generally
Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1
(1985) (analyzing relationship between precaution against injuries and allocation of cost of
injuries); Cooter &Eisenberg, supranote 59, at1432 (exploring differences between expectation
and reliance damages); CharlesJ. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle Toward a
General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967 (1983) (noting divergence between
cost-minimizing principles of mitigation and common law contractual obligations). For a
discussion of the effect of contract damage rules on precaution taken by both the promisee and
promisor and on the choice of a contracting party, see Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies,
Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629 (1988) (finding that
efficiency of incentives to take precautions against breaches depends on whether remedy is over-
or undercompensatory and on availability of substitute mechanisms).
64. See POsNER, supra note 2, at 130-31 (noting that to compel specific performance in
particular cases can result in systematic undervaluation of costs of breach).
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response of common-law judges.65 Judges often refer to the theory
of efficient breach, particularly when approving full compensation to
the victim of a breach (as in the case of recovery for emotional
distress)66 or when denying more-than-full recovery (as when denying
recovery of punitive damages),67 and are comfortable with its
implications.' It is hard to find a first-year contracts casebook that
does not teach the basic principles of efficient breach. 9 Yet, only
the simplest examples are considered, and it is difficult to extrapolate
from these examples to the variety of special circumstances in which
contract damage rules are applied. To a large extent, difficulty with
the concept of value has impeded application of the theory to more
complicated cases. Rather than thinking of contracts as a way of
allocating resources to more valuable uses, it is useful to think of
justifying a breach of contract as a way of generating a greater total
65. The Restatement provides:
In classic economic theory the mechanism of exchange resulting from bargain is
essential to the voluntary reallocation of goods, labor and other resources in a socially
desirable manner. However, a party may err in calculating the net benefit to be
expected from the performance of a bargain, or circumstances may so change as to
disappoint his expectations. A contract that he once thought would be profitable may
therefore become unprofitable for him. If the contract is still profitable for the other
party, however, a question arises as to whether the reluctant party should be compelled
to perform. The answer provided by at least some economic analysis tends to confirm
the traditional response of common-law judges in dealing with this question.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, introductory note (1979).
66. See Gaglidari v. Denny's Restaurants, Inc., 815 P.2d 1362, 1377 (Wash. 1991) (Utterj.,
concurring and dissenting) (advocating allowing recovery for emotional distress to discourage
economically inefficient breaches).
67. See, e.g., Thyssen, Inc. v. SS Fortune Star, 777 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985) (encouraging
breaches of contract that are efficient and wealth-enhancing by denying award of punitive
damages in addition to traditional contract remedies); Reiver v. Murdoch & Walsh, PA., 625 F.
Supp. 998, 1015 (D. Del. 1985) (ruling that plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages
following intentional efficient breach unless breach is similar in character to intentional tort);
Harris v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 649, 653 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1993) (finding
that limitations on liability in contract law encourage efficient breaches, resulting in increased
production of goods at lower cost to society); Kutzin v. Pirnie, 591 A.2d 932, 941 (NJ. 1991)
(declining to impose penalties that deter efficient breaches of contract).
68. Opinions reveal thatjudges are comfortable with the idea that an efficient breach is a
breach in which one party decides that it is not in her interest to perform as promised. See
Magallanes Inv., Inc. v. Circuit Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1214, 1219-20 (7th Cir. 1993). In MagaUanes,
a buyer, who had promised to pay $257 per ton for a ship, defaulted after finding that it could
only earn $220 per ton for the ship on resale. See iU. at 1220. The buyer's telegram informing
the seller that he fully understood the implications of the default was read by the court as "a
notice of an efficient breach by the buyer." Id. at 1220. The cases cited in note 67, supra,
demonstrate that courts approve of the policy of wealth maximization underlying efficient
breach. See Centric Corp. v. Morrison-Knudson Co., 731 P.2d 411, 413-14 (Okla. 1986) ("Hard
bargaining, efficient breaches, and reasonable settlements of good faith disputes are acceptable,
even desirable, in our economic system."); 3 E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.8, at 195-96
(1990) ("Most courts have not infringed on the freedom to keep or to break a contract
traditionally afforded a party by the common law and endorsed by the notion of efficient
breach.") (footnotes omitted).
69. See supra note 6 (listing examples of casebooks that discuss efficient breach).
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surplus.
Consider the simple example depicted in Figure 4, above, in which
a buyer has contracted to pay $1000 for a performance she values at
$1500. Another buyer may entice the seller to breach by offering
$1100 for the same performance, which the second buyer values at
$2000. The second buyer's use may be more valuable, in the Restate-
ment sense of the word, but allocating the performance to the second
buyer may not produce the greatest surplus, or the greatest increase
in wealth for society. Breach may be inefficient.
Figure 7 depicts the value of the performances to Buyers 1 and 2.
For the sake of expository convenience, the performances require the
same direct and collateral costs by the seller. At the prices given in
the preceding paragraph, the surplus generated for Buyer 2 is only
$150, less than the $500 Buyer 1 would have earned. Despite the
higher value, the surplus available to Buyer 2 is lower because of his
collateral costs. Although it is true that the seller makes $100 more
from the deal with Buyer 2, that is insufficient to make the breach
profitable because the seller must pay damages to Buyer 1. Assuming
that there has been no prepayment by Buyer 1, damages will be equal
to Buyer l's lost surplus, $500, which outweighs the additional $100
the seller earns from selling to Buyer 2. Given his collateral costs,
Buyer 2 is unable to offer the seller enough to make breach profit-
able. Nor is breach efficient. The potential surplus available to be
shared in the deal between the seller and Buyer 1 is $250 greater
($1500 - $1250) than for the deal with Buyer 2. Even though the
resource is more valuable in the hands of Buyer 2 (in the Restatement
sense of total revenues it will generate), it generates less surplus.
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If Buyer 2 could reduce his collateral costs enough to raise his bid
more than $500 above Buyer l's bid, breach not only would be
efficient (because it would increase the total surplus produced by the
second use to an amount greater than that available from the first
use), but it also would be profitable. When Buyer 2 reduces his
collateral costs from $750 (the amount in Figure 7) to $150, Buyer 2's
reservation price increases to $1850, more than enough to induce the
seller to breach. Buyer 2 would be willing, for instance, to offer
$1700, which, even after paying damages of $500, leaves the seller
with $1200, more than she would have earned from performing as
promised. Having reduced the collateral costs necessary to obtain the
value of $2000, the surplus available to be shared by the parties has
increased by an amount equal to the collateral cost savings and to an
amount that is greater than the surplus to be shared with Buyer 1.
This decrease in costs makes breach profitable and desirable from an
economic perspective. The values of the buyers' uses have not
changed in the two examples. It is because the surplus has changed
that breach suddenly becomes efficient.
Focusing on surplus rather than on value also illustrates why
contract theory is concerned with the efficiency of breach. Aside
from the apparent increase in surplus, which constitutes an addition
to the wealth of society, the example illustrates the source of the
increase in wealth. Collateral costs are real resources-whether raw
materials, labor, or time-expended in making the item purchased
useful. The example above illustrates the conservation of those
resources without a diminution of the value obtained. It is this saving
of real resources that generates the increased wealth.
Focusing on surplus also facilitates analysis of efficient breach in
substitute transactions cases. In Laredo Hides Co. v. H & H Meat
Products Co.,7" H & H Meat repudiated its contract to sell to Laredo
Hides, which covered by buying hides from another seller and was
able to complete its resale of the hides to Mexican tanneries."1 The
value of the promised and substituted performance was the same, but
70. 513 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. C. App. 1974).
71. See Laredo Hides Co. v. H & H Meat Prods. Co., 513 S.W.2d 210, 216 (Tex. Ct. App.
1974).
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the direct and collateral costs associated with each were different.
v2
Imagine that the figures in the Laredo Hides Co. transaction are as
shown in Figure 8, in which the value of performance remains
constant at $600 but costs increase by $150, and profits are reduced
by that same amount. Direct costs (costs of buying hides) increase by
$100 (from $250 to $350), and collateral costs (costs of shipping hides
to Mexico) increase by $50 (from $100 to $150). The Difference-in-
Value rule73 will not yield the correct answer without adjustments,
because the value (in the Restatement sense) does not change. A
Difference-in-Surplus 4 rule readily reveals the correct damage
amount as the difference in profits, $150 (the difference between
$250 and $100). Breach is efficient only if the total surplus generated
by the breach exceeds the total surplus that would have resulted from
performance.
Value of Value of








-- Direct Costs -
FIGURE 8
Evaluating the profitability and efficiency of breach in substitute
transactions cases mimics the evaluation of these issues in other cases.
To determine the profitability of breach, the seller must compare the
price the second buyer offers with the damage payments due the first
party.'5 Whenever the second price offer exceeds the first price
offer by an amount sufficient to pay damages yet leaves more than the
72. See id.
73. See infra notes 109-22 and accompanying text (describing Difference-in-Value rule).
74. See infra notes 136-43 and accompanying text (describing Difference-in-Surplus rule).
75. In Laredo Hides Co., for example, H & H would have to consider the price offered by
its second buyer and the damages it would owe Laredo in the event of breach.
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first price, the seller has an incentive to breach. Breach will be
efficient in all such cases, because only a second buyer with a
potential surplus greater than the first buyer's will be willing to offer
such a high price. For substitute transactions cases, damages are
equal to lost profits, which equal the sum of increased direct and
collateral costs if the value of performance stays the same.
7 6
For breach to be profitable in substitute transaction cases, the
second buyer's offer must exceed the first buyer's price by the
amount of the increased costs that the injured party will sustain.
Because damages are equal to those increased costs, it is that amount
that the party contemplating breach must consider. This consider-
ation is appropriate from a social point of view, because the seller's
breach increased the first buyer's costs of producing exactly the same
result. Only if the surplus earned by the second party is so great that
it makes up for this loss will breach be desirable from a cost-minimiz-
ing/wealth-maximizing viewpoint.
IV. RECONCILING CONFLICTING MEANING OF "VALUE" IN
DAMAGE RULES
Recognizing the equivalency between the Restatement approach to
damages and the surplus-based approach facilitates appreciation of
the relationships among the three damages formulae that are based
on value. Conflicting meanings of value are embodied in: (1) the
Restatement formula (the "value plus breach-related costs less costs
avoided" approach to damages); (2) the Difference-in-Value formula
(the "difference between value promised and value received"
approach); and (3) the Contract Price formula (the "value equals
contract price" approach). The Restatement and Contract Price
formulae are equivalent under certain restricted conditions, but the
Restatement and Difference-in-Value definitions of value are irreconcil-
able. This section describes the circumstances under which value, in
the Restatement sense, equals contract price, then discusses the
fundamentally different concept of value embodied in the Difference-
in-Value formula for contract damages.
A. The Restatement Formula and the Contract Price
Awarding the contract price yields the same result as applying the
Restatement formula whenever: (1) the contract is not an integral part
of a larger project being undertaken by the injured party; (2) there
76. See Laredo Hides Co., 513 S.W.2d at 216.
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is no need to adjust the amount of damages to reflect direct or
collateral costs avoided by the injured party as a result of breach; (3)
no breach-related costs were incurred; and (4) no mitigation of losses
was attempted by the injured party. Discussion of the adjustments
necessary to account for the possible complications to damage
recovery-enumerated above as (2) to (4)-would be relevant to a
dissertation on damages calculations, but those adjustments are not
relevant to the conflicting definitions of value appearing in contract
rules. This section discusses the implications for damage rules of the
"larger project" problem for buyers and sellers (item (1) above) and
the treatment of that problem by the Uniform Commercial Code
("U.C.C."). This section also identifies the surplus-based approach as
a more straightforward conceptual tool while recognizing that the
availability of data occasionally may make damages easier to calculate
under an explicitly value-based formula.
The Restatement formula and the Contract Price formula have
coincident meanings for value when the contract breached was not an
integral part of a larger project in which the victim of the breach was
engaged." The "larger project" condition recognizes that the
injured party's anticipated surplus would have been earned by using
the other's performance in furtherance of another endeavor. Some
of these cases involve injured parties who have been promised loans
of money to be used to finance a larger project. Native Alaskan
Reclamation & Pest Control, Inc. v. United Bank of Alaska7" is such a
case. The bank loan at issue in that case would have been used to
77. In the broadest sense, every contract is part of a "larger project," which simply may be
"the project of increasing the wealth of the contracting party." Contract law does not recognize
the right to receive compensation for all costs associated with such a larger project. See Hadley
v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854) (denying recovery of damages for losses in profit
not reasonably foreseen by breaching party). Recovery of collateral costs is limited to cases in
which the larger project is reasonably foreseeable to or within the contemplation of both parties.
See id. Cases applying the Hadley rule focus on the foreseeability that the victim of the breach
would incur particular costs rather than on the foreseeability of a larger project of which they
might be a part, but if a particular "larger project" is unforeseeable, then, a fort/o, costs
associated with that project are unforeseeable and therefore unrecoverable. See Rochester
Lantern Co. v. Stiles & Parker Press Co., 31 N.E. 1018, 1021 (N.Y. 1892) (denying recovery for
incurred costs not reasonably foreseen by breaching party); see also Florida E. Coast Ry. Co. v.
Beaver St. Fisheries, Inc., 537 So. 2d 1065, 1068 (Fla. 1989) (denying special damages against
railway for unforeseeable replacement costs associated with jet charter). Recovery similarly is
denied when the lost profits are too speculative, because, for instance, the breaching party could
not anticipate the nature of the larger project of which the contract in question allegedly was
a part. For example, in Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 493 N.E.2d 234, 235 (N.Y. 1989), the
complainant, who donated land to a county for development of a sports stadium in exchange
for the right to manage the facility, was denied recovery of lost profits on anticipated
development of peripheral lands after the county failed to build the stadium (loss of profits not
in the contemplation of the parties at the time of execution of the contract was too speculative).
78. 685 P.2d 1211 (Alaska 1984).
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restore and resell airplanes. 79 Awarding the borrower corporation
the amount it would have paid for the loan (principle plus inter-
est)-the contract price-would have undercompensated the injured
party, because the breach had deprived him of the opportunity to
participate in the restoration and reselling project and to earn the
associated profits."0
Because money is often a business' ultimate purpose for contract-
ing, victims with larger projects typically are promised a resource
other than money. In Wartzman v. Hightower Productions, Ltd.,81 a
client contracted for a lawyer's assistance in incorporating his
business, intending to use the incorporated status to further his
planned commercial exploitation of an entertainment event."2 The
failure of the lawyer to deliver his promised performance prevented
the business from being able to raise sufficient funds to proceed with
its plans."3 As illustrated in Wartzman, the likelihood that buyers will
use the resource promised in exchange for the purchase price to
further a larger project, even if only the resale of the resource,
justifies application of U.C.C. sections 2-711,84 2-713,"5 and 2-715,"8
which allow buyers who have paid the purchase price in full to
recover lost profits in addition to the contract price. Award of the
contract price alone, whether it is measured in the dollars of principal
and interest to be repaid, the dollar amount of a purchase price, or
bushels of grain, understates the loss suffered by the injured party
when the promised performance was to have been part of a larger
project. When cover is not reasonably available to buyers, the award
of a substantially equivalent performance, which would be something
resembling the contract price is, by definition, not reasonably
possible, often because it would be too late.87
79. See Native Alaskan Reclamation & Pest Control, Inc. v. United Bank of Alaska, 685 P.2d
1211, 1213 (Alaska 1984).
80. See id. at 1223 (affirming expectation damages awarded by trial court).
81. 456 A.2d 82 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983).
82. See Wartzman v. Hightower Prods., Ltd., 456 A.2d 82, 84 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983).
83. See id. at 86.
84. The U.C.C. allows a buyer to recover "so much of the price as has been paid" in
addition to "damages for non-deliveryas provided in [§ 2-713]." U.C.C. §§ 2-711(1), (b) (1987).
85. The U.C.C. allows recovery of"any incidental and consequential damages provided in
[§ 2-715]." Id. § 2-713(1).
86. The U.C.C. allows recovery of consequential damages including "any loss resulting from
general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had
reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise." Id. § 2-
715(2)(a). The U.C.C. explicitly recognizes that the reselling of goods "is one of the
requirements of which the seller has reason to know within the meaning of subsection (2) (a)."
I& § 2-715 cmt. 6.
87. See Native Alaskan Reclamation & Pest Control, Inc. v. United Bank of Alaska, 685 P.2d
1211, 1221 (Alaska 1984) (finding that court award equal to amount of business loan would be
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When addressing remedies based on the contract price, the U.C.C.
implicitly views sellers as having no larger project in mind when
engaging in a sale. The U.C.C. recognizes the opportunity for both
buyers and sellers to re-enter the market for the goods in question to
minimize the losses associated with breachA Buyers may procure
substitute goods and recover "the difference between the cost of cover
and the contract price together with any incidental and consequential
damages" with adjustments for expenses saved. s9 Sellers may resell
the goods and recover the difference between the market price and
the unpaid contract price "together with any incidental damages" with
adjustments for expenses saved.9" Resale is the seller's primary
remedy under the U.C.C., but the U.C.C. also recognizes that in
special cases in which resale is not feasible, "the action for the price
... would then be necessary to give the seller the value of his
contract."91 The U.C.C. allows for recovery of incidental damages
(breach-related costs)9" but makes no explicit allowance for recovery
of consequential damages (lost profits in the U.C.C. context) as it
does for buyers9" in sections 2-71211 and 2-715.95 The contract
price is presumed to include all of the seller's anticipated surplus.
When mitigation by resale or cover is impossible, a buyer or seller
would be unable to recoup profits associated with a larger project by
taking advantage of a substitute performance. Because the underlying
goal of U.C.C. damage remedies is to put the injured party in as good
a position as performance would have done,96 one might anticipate
judicial opinions allowing sellers an alternative to the market
too late because business opportunity had passed); Wartzman, 456 A.2d at 86 (finding that court
award of equivalent lawyer services would be too late because opportunity to exploit
entertainment event had passed).
88. See U.G.C. § 2-706 (1) (allowing seller to resell goods); id. § 2-712(1) (allowing buyer
to purchase substitute).
89. Id § 2-712(2) (emphasis added).
90. I § 2-706(1) (emphasis added).
91. Id. § 2-704 cmt. 1.
92. See id. § 2-710.
93. See HAWKLAND, supra note 7, at §§ 2-710:01, 2-711:02 (stating that buyer is permitted to
recover consequential damages in appropriate cases, but that seller does not have such right).
94. See U.C.G. § 2-712(2) (allowing buyer to recover difference between cost of cover and
contract price plus any incidental or consequential damages less expenses saved).
95. U.C.C. section 2-715 defines incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach as
.expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of
goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in
connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or
breach." Id. § 2-715(1). Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include any
loss of which the seller had reason to know at the time of contract but which could not have
been prevented reasonably and any injury "proximately resulting from any breach of warranty."
Id § 2-715(2)(a)-(b).
96. See id. § 1-106(1) (stating that remedies shall be administered liberally so that aggrieved
party is in position as if performance occurred).
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price/contract price differential of U.C.C. section 2-708(l)" 7 to
account for "larger project" situations. An alternative remedy for
sellers appears in U.C.C. section 2-708(2). This provision offers the
surplus-based approach," which is equivalent to the Restatement ap-
proach in that it allows for a divergence between contract price and
value, in which a remedy based on the contract price falls to compen-
sate the injured party fully.99 The cases in which courts apply section
2-708(2), however, are not the "larger project" cases. They are
typically cases involving specialty goods with no established market
price," ° lost volume sellers, 1 ' or jobbers° 2-- all factual contexts
that disable the court from applying the customary damage measure
in section 2-708(1). For sellers, at least, the U.C.C. treats the contract
price as reflecting the entire return (the value in the Restatement
sense) the seller would have received as a result of the buyer's
performance. There are, of course, cases in which the award of the
contract price is fully compensatory and results in the same award as
the Restatement approach."0 3 In such cases, the seller's only anticipat-
ed return from the contract was the price, so the contract price
accurately reflects the value.
97. U.C.C. section 2-708(1) measures the seller's damages as the difference between the
market price and the unpaid contract price, plus incidentals, less expenses saved.
98. U.C.C. section 2-708(2) establishes as the measure of damages "the profit (including
reasonable overhead) which the seller would have made from full performance by the buyer,
together with any incidental damages provided in [section 2-710], due allowance for costs
reasonably incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds of resale."
99. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
100. See Tigg Corp. v. Dow Coming Corp., 962 F.2d 1119, 1129 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that
contract/market damages must be determined inadequate before § 2-708(2) can be applied for
seller); Taft-Pierce Mfg. Co. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 789 F. Supp. 1220, 1228 (D.R.I. 1992)
(distinguishing specialty item with limited market from unfinished item with no market price
subject to § 2-708(2) remedy).
101. SeeR.E. Davis Chem. Corp. v. Diasonics, Inc., 924 F.2d 709, 710 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating
that contract/market damages may be inadequate when seller has finite number of customers
and limited capacity for resale); Ragen Corp. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 912 F.2d 619,627 (3d
Cir. 1990) (defining lost volume seller as one who resells product at same price but loses profit
from first sale because second buyer would have purchased product anyway).
102. See Blair Int'l Ltd. v. LaBarge, Inc., 675 F.2d 954, 960 (8th Cir. 1982) (stating that § 2-
708(2) is applicable when jobber seller never acquires contract goods and when decision not
to acquire goods after learning of breach is commercially reasonable);JAMEsJ. WHtTE & ROBERT
S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 313-21 (3d ed. 1988) (discussing application of § 2-
708(2) to lost volume sellers, components, jobber sellers, and selected other cases in which
contract price measure is inappropriate without discussing larger project issue).
103. See Connecticut Inv. Casting Corp. v. Made-Rite Tool Co., 416 N.E.2d 966,969-70 (Mass.
1981) (awarding full contract price to seller of barrel latches because buyer did not revoke
acceptance properly); Aymond v. Lambert, 262 So. 2d 795, 796 (La. Ct. App. 1972) (awarding
contract price to seller who completed furnishing and installation of central air conditioner
without defect that was accepted by buyer who then refused to pay).
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B. Value in Substitute Transactions Cases
Substitute transactions cases are those involving: (1) breach of
warranty; (2) defective, partial, or substantial performance; (3) cover;
and (4) resale."' All of these cases are characterized by a perfor-
mance rendered that differs from a performance promised. They can
be resolved by reference to a rule that awards the difference in value
between the performance promised and the substitute performance
received. In the warranty cases and defective, partial, or substantial
performance cases, the promisor substitutes a less desirable perfor-
mance for the one promised. In cover and resale cases, the injured
party obtains the performance from another (substitute) person.
10 5
To cover the widest variety of substitute transaction cases, however,
value must be understood to mean "surplus or profit," rather than
anticipated total return including enough to cover costs and provide
a surplus (the Restatement section 347 sense). This section explores
the application of the Difference-in-Value rule to substitute transac-
tion cases, considers the limited circumstances in which the difference
in the value of two performances is a sensible measure of damages,
and compares the relative simplicity and conceptual accuracy of a
Difference-in-Surplus rule.
The Difference-in-Value rule appears to students of contracts in
Hawkins v. McGee,"06 the "hairy hand" case in which the court held that
the plaintiff was entitled to the difference in value between a good
hand and the quality of the hand that the doctor produced."0 7 In such
cases, when the injured party realizes some of the value anticipated
from the other's performance, damages are reduced accordingly. 08
104. See sources cited at infra notes 112-15 (ascertaining damages in substitute transaction
cases).
105. See Laredo Hides Co. v. H & H Meat Prods. Co., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 210, 221 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1974) (holding that plaintiff was within purview of cover by purchasing hides from
substitute seller).
106. 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929).
107. See Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641, 644 (N.H. 1929).
108. An injured party is entitled to the difference between the value anticipated from
performance and the value received. See id. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 347 (1979) (entitling injured party to only "loss in value"). With respect to partial
performance, the Restatement provides:
If no performance is rendered, the loss in value caused by the breach is equal to the
value that the performance would have had to the injured party ... If defective or
partial performance is rendered, the loss in value caused by the breach is equal to the
difference between the value that the performance would have had if there had been
no breach and the value of such performance as was actually rendered.
ld. § 347 cmt. b.
With respect to reduction in damages that reasonably can be avoided by mitigation, see i&t
§ 350 (stating that injured party's attempts to avoid injury will limit damage awards).
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Construction cases'09 are as prominent among partial and defective
performance cases in casebooks as "reconstruction" cases like
Hawkins,"' although partial performance also may occur in sales of
goods or services contexts."' The comparison of differences in the
values of two transactions is most obviously apparent in cover and
resale cases." 2 Whatever the type of case, the damages calculation
becomes more complicated because the outcomes associated with two
transactions, the promised performance and the realized perfor-
mance, must be compared."
3
In the most straightforward substitute performance cases, the
Difference-in-Value approach yields the correct measure of damages,
even when the Restatement definition of value is applied. The simplest
illustration of a substitute performance case in which the Difference-
in-Value formula gives the correct answer under the Restatement
definition is one in which there has been partial payment for goods
accepted. Partial payment cases are substitute performance cases,
because the breaching buyer has substituted partial for full payment.
In these cases, the award may be based on the contract price, with
adjustments for the performance rendered, so that the contract price
also reflects the value of the contract to the seller in the Restatement
sense.
Industrial Molded Plastic Products, Inc. v. f Gross & Son, Inc."4 is a
simple application of the Difference-in-Value rule in a breaching
buyer context. The manufacturer in this case manufactured five
million plastic clips for a clothing wholesaler who paid only $203.55
109. See, e.g., Castricone v. Michaud, 583 N.E.2d 1184 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (allowing
homeowners to recover amount in excess of contract needed to complete construction after
complaints about quality halted construction of home before completion);J.E. Pierce v. Drees,
607 N.E.2d 726 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that defective construction of garage was breach
of contract); K & G Constr. Co. v. Harris, 164 A.2d 451, 456 (Md. 1960) (determining that
partial performance by subcontractor was breach of contract).
110. See Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 185 (Mass. 1973) (allowing entertainer to
recover damages as remedy for defective reconstruction of nose).
111. See Rowan Heating-Air Conditioning-Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Williams, 580 A.2d 583, 584
(D.C. 1990) (awarding purchaser amount needed to complete and repair defective heating and
air conditioning system); Miller v. Bealer, 608 N.E.2d 1133, 1135 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that partially-performed auto repair was breach of contract).
112. See City Univ. of N.Y. v. Finalco, Inc., 514 N.Y.S.2d 244,246 (App. Div. 1987) (affirming
resale case in which seller found substitute buyer after contractor refused to perform); Laredo
Hides Co. v. H & H Meat Prods. Co., 513 S.W.2d 210, 216 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974) (considering
cover case in which middleman brought from second supplier to complete obligations to
buyers).
113. One also might view the straightforward cases of total breach with no cover or resale
as "substitute transaction" cases, with no performance substituted for the promised performance.
The comparison of the two transactions is simplified because there is no value to the lack of
performance and there is no possibility for an increase in either performance or enhancing
costs.
114. 398 A.2d 695 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
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of its $31,710.00 obligation."' The value of the contract to the
manufacturer was the purchase price, $31,710.00,116 as the sale was
not part of any particular larger project for the seller. If this contract
had been part of a larger project of which the sale was only a part,
the contract price might have been less than the value of the contract
in the Restatement sense, but that was not the case. The unpaid
balance in Industrial Molded Plastic Products, $31,506.45,' 7 represents
not the unpaid profit but the loss in value due to the buyer's breach.
Lost profit would be the purchase price less the cost of supplying the
clips. All direct and collateral expenses already had been incurred by
the manufacturer, so there were no "costs avoided" by the manufac-
turer.' At the same time, the breaching party's behavior imposed
no additional costs, as would be present when the manufacturer
incurs breach-related costs."1 In this instance, therefore, awarding
the unpaid contract price accurately reflects the loss in value caused
by the breach.
It is easy to see that a Difference-in-Surplus rule would yield the
same result in cases such as Industrial Molded Plastic Products. Instead
of earning whatever profit the plastics manufacturer expected, for
example, $5000.00 of the $31,710.00 contract price, the partial
payment created a loss. If $5000.00 would have been profit, then
$26,710.00 was cost to be covered by the full payment. The partial
payment of only $203.55 would result in a loss of $26,506.45
($26,710.00 - $203.55). To restore the manufacturer to its full profit
potential, the difference between the loss produced and the profit
expected requires a payment of $26,506.45 (to cover the costs) and
an additional $5000.00 (to cover the lost profit). The difference in
surplus is the difference between $5000.00 and negative $26,506.45,
which is $31,506.45, the unpaid balance of the contract price.
In every case in which the injured party incurs additional costs as
a result of the breach or covers or sells at a price different from the
contract price, however, the Difference-in-Value formula yields the
wrong answer if the Restatement definition of value is applied literally.
The Difference-in-Surplus approach results in a correct award of
damages. Some cases in which costs are incurred as a result of breach
are cases in which the value of the substitute performance to the
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injured party is unchanged, but the costs associated with obtaining
that value change because of the breaching party's default. In Spang
Industries Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,12 the buyer of steel
incurred increased collateral costs in pouring cement for a bridge
because the steel was delivered late."' Here, the seller of steel may
be viewed as substituting a late performance for a timely performance.
The value of the steel is determined by reference to the payment the
contractor was to receive for the completed bridge, not the price paid
for the steel. Because the payment for the bridge did not change, the
value of the steel (in the Restatement sense) did not change."' No
damages would be awarded under the value-based approach if the
Restatement meaning of value were applied literally. Nevertheless, the
contractor/buyer was awarded the amount of increased costs because
failing to do so would have reduced the surplus associated with the
steel contract, which is the profit from building the bridge on
time.123 The same difference in result would occur if the buyer of
steel were forced to cover by substituting a purchase from a higher
priced steel supplier for the contract steel. 24 It would be more
accurate to apply a Difference-in-Surplus approach, which, as will be"
illustrated, makes adjustments for changes in direct, collateral, and
breach-related costs.
Once the Difference-in-Value formula is adjusted to reflect the
difference in costs incurred, the result is essentially the same as
applying a more straightforward Difference-in-Surplus rule. The
breach in Spangimposed breach-related costs on the bridge manufac-
turer, costs not included in the anticipated direct or collateral costs
that would have been incurred even if breach had not occurred. 5
The increased costs of pouring cement would be recoverable as a
breach-related cost incurred (a cost not anticipated but caused by the
breach), without reference to changes in value.
A similar error occurs if the difference in value is not adjusted to
reflect costs avoided. When an injured party receives and pays for
only half of the goods promised by the breaching party, the Differ-
ence-in-Value approach would award the buyer half of the value of the
contract, which would be an incorrect result. Costs avoided must be
120. 512 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1975).
121. See Spang Indus. Inc. v. Aema Cas. & Sur. Co., 512 F.2d 365, 367 (2d Cir. 1975).
122. See id. at 371 (concluding that prompt response to breach provided reasonable
mitigation thereby avoiding serious damage to larger project).
123. See id.
124. See Laredo Hides Co. v. H & H Meat Prods. Co., 513 S.W.2d 210, 221 (Tex. Ct. App.
1974) (substituting higher-priced hides for those promised under contract).
125. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing breach-related costs).
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deducted to avoid overcompensating the injured party. By deducting
costs avoided, the court essentially "is awarding the difference in
surplus (the difference between the value of two transactions and costs
associated with the two transactions), rather than simply the differ-
ence in value. Deducting costs avoided from lost value yields the
amount of profit that would have been earned had performance
occurred.
The same conclusion applies to cover and resale cases. When
collateral costs associated with the substitute performance are
different, but the value of the transaction is unchanged, a comparison
of values (in the Restatement sense) again will undercompensate. In
Laredo Hides Co.,126 Laredo Hides incurred a $3,448.95 increase in
transportation and handling costs associated with buying hides in a
cover transaction. 27 Even if it could have sold the substitute hides
to its buyers for the same price as the promised hides (that is, if it
could have realized the same total value), Laredo Hides would have
suffered a loss if the difference in value was the basis for the damage
calculation. The increased costs affect the amount of surplus earned,
not the value of the hides purchased, and it is the dfference in surplus
that must be awarded.
Only when the cover and resale transactions involve no change in
either the direct or collateral costs involved will the Difference-in-
Value rule give a correct damage calculation. If Laredo Hides had
incurred no increase in transportation and handling (collateral costs)
and had paid the same price for the substitute hides, the damage
award properly would be based on the difference in the price the
tanneries would be willing to pay for the substitute hides. That price
reflects the total revenues Laredo Hides anticipated earning from the
breaching party's performance, the value of that performance.128
Similarly, in City University of New York v. Finalco, Inc.,129 a resale case,
the only change in the transaction was the price obtained from the
substitute buyer of used computers, which was lower than the price
promised by the breaching party."° The seller's direct cost (giving
up the used computers) and collateral costs (none) were un-
126. 513 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. C. App. 1974).
127. See Laredo Hides Co., 513 S.W.2d at 216. For a resale case presenting similar issues, see
McMillan v. Meuser Material & Equip., 541 S.W.2d 911 (Ark. 1976) (awarding increased costs
of maintaining bulldozer until resale was possible).
128. See Red River Commodities, Inc. v. Eidsness, 459 N.W.2d 811, 818 (N.D. 1990)
(awarding damages equal to difference between contract price for 229,000 pounds of sunflowers
($25,762.50) and cover price ($59,540.00)).
129. 514 N.Y.S.2d 244 (App. Div. 1987).
130. See City Univ. of N.Y. v. Finalco, Inc., 514 N.Y.S.2d 244, 245 (App. Div. 1987).
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changed.'3 ' The proper damage award is the difference in value
received by the seller, which properly is captured in the difference in
contract price.
The Difference-in-Surplus rule yields the correct measure of
damages in cover and resale cases, as it does in all substitute
performance cases. Figure 8, above, depicts the value of a promised
and a substitute performance in a cover case. To realize the value of
the promised performance, the injured party anticipated incurring
$100 in collateral costs and $250 in direct costs to obtain the total
value of $600 from the breaching party's performance and to earn a
$250 surplus. The substitute performance has a similar value
although collateral costs and direct costs have increased (to $150 and
$350, respectively), squeezing surplus from top and bottom down to
$100. To receive the benefit of his bargain-that is, to be placed in
the same wealth position she would have occupied had there been no
breach-the injured party must receive $150 in damages, the differ-
ence in surpluses, even if there is no change in value.
Many cover and resale cases are more complicated but can be
addressed using the same surplus-based framework. When a buyer
covers with better or worse quality goods, the difference in surpluses
captures the essence of the injured party's losses. In Martella v.
Woods,132 a case in which the buyer bought heifers of a better quality
than those promised by the breaching party,133 the increased price
the injured party obtained from resale of the better heifers translated
into increased profit (surplus) and was taken into account as the
court reduced damages to an amount less than the simple'difference
in price.1m
The bottom line for damages reflects the surplus resulting from all
of the related transactions. Buyers may arrange a series of transac-
tions to protect themselves from damages associated with nondelivery
or late delivery. Accordingly, in Fertico Belgium S.A. v. Phosphate
Chemicals Export Ass'n, Inc.,"3 5 the buyer/trader, Fertico, covered (at
131. See id.
132. 715 F.2d 410 (8th Cir. 1983).
133. See Martella v. Woods, 715 F.2d 410, 412 (8th Cir. 1983).
134. The buyer covered by buying a herd of heifers that was heavier and composed of more
pregnant cows than the contract heifers. See id. There is no mention of a general market
increase or decrease, so it may be assumed that the difference in market prices between the
higher quality cover heifers and the contract heifers reflects an increase in the value of the herd
acquired. With an increased price and increased value, the difference in surplus, which reflects
both the difference in value and the difference in prices, is S - S2 = (DCr DC1) - (V -V2),
where S = surplus, DC = direct costs, V = value, and the subscript = either the original (1) or
cover (2) transaction.
135. 510 N.E.2d 334 (N.Y. 1987).
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an increased cost of $700,000) in order to avoid breaching its own
contract with a subsequent buyer."6 It sold the cover fertilizer at a
renegotiated higher price that included more expensive transporta-
tion." 7 When the original fertilizer finally arrived, Fertico sold it to
another buyer for a $454,000 profit.s Damages, in this situation,
equal the changes in values received and the changes in costs
incurred in all of the transactions-the difference in surplus rather
than simply the differences in value. For the resale of the cover
fertilizer, there is an increase in cover price ($700,000), an increase
in collateral costs (the more expensive transport), and an increase in
the value of the renegotiated contract. For the sale of the contract
fertilizer, there is a $454,000 surplus. 39 Like Martella, the award in
Ferticoreflects differences in costs andvalues, not simply the difference
in values.14
CONCLUSION
For reasons of clarity and analytical convenience, it is preferable to
conceptualize damage rules in terms of surplus lost and costs
incurred. When a seller has no larger project of which the promised
performance is an integral part, the contract price accurately
measures the seller's loss only when all of the seller's costs have been




139. There are three transactions in Fertico Bagiun (1) the resale Fertico had planned to
make when contracting with a surplus S = V, - DC1 - CC, (where S = surplus, V = value, DC =
direct costs, and CC = collateral costs associated with the first contract); (2) the renegotiated
resale with an increased value (higher resale price), direct cost (due to $700,000 increased price
of cover fertilizer) and collateral costs (due to more expensive transportation) with a surplus S2
= V2 -DC, - CC2, (subscript 2 = second deal); and (8) assuming as the trial court did, that this
third transaction was made possible only by the breach, the resale to a new buyer (with a surplus
S3 = $454,000). See id Damages equal the difference between the first surplus, S,, and the sum
of the other surpluses, S2 + S3, that is:
Damages = S, - (S2 + Ss) = (VI -DC - CC) - [(V2 - DC, - CC2) + (S3)].
The award would reflect the difference in cost between the first two deals ((DC -DC, ) + (CC, -
CC,)), plus the difference in values between the contracts (VI -V2), less the surplus earned on
the resale to a new buyer, S.
Serendipitous circumstances simplified the calculation of damages in Feico when the Court
of Appeals found that the increased contract price reflected in V2 exactly offset the increased
transportation costs reflected in CC, and that the third transaction would have occurred even
without the breach (making Fertico a lost volume seller). See id. at 468 (describing lower court
decision from which Fertico appealed). Ultimately, damages were simply the difference between
the contract price and the cover price, that is:
Damages = (V - DC - CC) - (V2 - DC, - CC) and,
because V, -V2 = CC, - CC,,
Damages = DC, - DC = $700,000.
See id. at 470 (awarding $700,000 in damages).
140. See id. at 468.
THE AMERICAN UNIvERSrIY LAW REVE W [o.
incurred and there is no substitute transaction. In those cases, the
contract price reflects the sum of surplus lost plus costs incurred. In
all other cases with no larger project, the contract price overstates the
seller's losses. A measure that adds to lost surplus only those costs
actually incurred precisely captures the losses. For buyers whose
intended purchase was part of a larger project, the contract price
measure does not suffice, because it fails to include lost profits to be
derived from the larger project. When an injured party intended to
use the other's performance as part of a larger project, the surplus-
based approach includes the benefits that would have flowed from the
larger project.
Focusing on surplus aids calculation of damages in more complicat-
ed cases as well. When the breaching party performs in part or
defectively or when the injured party arranges a substitute perfor-
mance, a surplus-based formula directs attention to the bottom
line-lost surplus-rather than focusing on changes in value received,
which, without adjustments, ignores the effect of the breach on
changes in costs. A buyer intending to resell to a third party may
cover by purchasing more expensive goods. The effect of the cover
is not to create a more valuable resale but to reduce profits, which
can be restored through damages. Similarly, a seller who resells after
the buyer's breach for less than the buyer promised suffers a
comparable loss in surplus for which she can be compensated through
damages without regard to the value of either the thwarted original
transaction or the substitute. A more intuitive and conceptually
clearer set of rules based on lost surplus easily could be drafted
without the conflicting definitions appearing in the current approach.
Consider, for example, the following language:
Proposed Surplus-Based Restatement of the Law of Contract Damages
§ 1. Subject to limitations described in § 2, the nonbreaching party
is entitled to recover in damages an amount equal to all losses
suffered as a result of the breach, including
(a) the surplus lost as a result of the other's failure to perform
as promised and
(b) costs incurred, whether they were
(i) incurred in anticipation of the other's performance and
wasted because of the breach or
(ii) caused by the other's breach.
§ 2. Losses, whether from lost surplus or from costs incurred, are
compensable only to the extent that
(a) the injured party could not have avoided them using
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reasonable methods,
(b) the parties contemplated or could reasonably have foreseen
that the losses would result from a failure to perform, and
(c) the fact of the loss and the amount of the loss are provable
with reasonable certainty.
§ 3. When the breaching party has performed in part and/or the
injured party has obtained substitute performance from another,
the injured party is entitled to recover in damages an amount equal
to the difference between the surplus she would have obtained if
the breaching party had performed as promised and the surplus
she obtained from the part performance or substitute performance
or both, taking into account the changes in all types of costs
incurred as a result of the breach, subject to the limitations
described in § 2.
Similarly, focusing on surplus rather than value aids in the analysis
of incentives created by contract damage rules. Despite economists'
focus on allocating resources to their most valuable uses, the well-
being of contracting parties and of society is enhanced by allocating
resources to the uses that generate the greatest surplus. Even when
the reallocation of a resource generates no increase in value, the
reallocation may be preferred because it increases surplus, adding to
society's wealth.
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